In the recent matter of Gobbo v State of Victoria [2025] VSC 334, the plaintiff (Nicole Maree Gobbo) commenced a personal injury compensation claim against the defendant, State of Victoria (Victoria Police).
Nicole Gobbo’s Early Career: From Barrister to Police Informer
The plaintiff began her career as a successful criminal defence barrister in Victoria, having signed the Bar roll in 1998. By the early 2000s, she was highly regarded and frequently appeared for clients charged with serious drug offences, including figures involved in Melbourne’s gangland wars such as Tony Mokbel, Carl Williams, and others. She was based at Crockett Chambers, among senior members of the Victorian criminal bar. However, in September 2005, the plaintiff made a secret and controversial shift—she became a registered police informer for Victoria Police, feeding them privileged information about her clients, while continuing to represent them in court.
Her dual role as barrister and informer lasted over three years, during which time her disclosures contributed to several high-profile convictions, including those of some of her own clients. In January 2009, Victoria Police deregistered her as an informer after she agreed to assist in the prosecution of Paul Dale. When safety concerns arose, she filed a proceeding against the State in 2010, resulting in a $3 million settlement and a release in favour of the State and police officers. She formally ceased legal practice in March 2009, and her role as a covert police source remained hidden for several more years.
In 2015, a review by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC) led the Director of Public Prosecutions to conclude that he was obliged to disclose the plaintiff’s informer role to affected defendants. Legal efforts by the Chief Commissioner of Police to prevent this disclosure on public interest immunity grounds ultimately failed. The High Court, upon receiving assurances about the plaintiff’s safety through witness protection, revoked its grant of special leave in 2018. This led to her public exposure as “Lawyer X.” The plaintiff then fled overseas with her children, initially assisted by Victoria Police, but ultimately took independent steps to secure their wellbeing abroad. They returned to Australia in December 2019 after their visas expired.
Upon their return, Victorian authorities imposed strict conditions on the plaintiff’s living situation, including compliance with police directions for her and her children’s safety. Despite these measures, tensions escalated when police failed to arrange a long-term relocation overseas. In September 2021, the Children’s Court ruled that the plaintiff’s children were at risk of harm due to the security threats surrounding their mother. With no viable protection plan in place, the family undertook to leave Australia for a secure, undisclosed destination. They have since returned and are now living a more stable life outside of Victoria.
Supreme Court Hearing
In this proceeding, commenced in September 2021, Ms Gobbo and the children seek damages for injuries they claim to have suffered as a result of the negligence of a number of individual police officers. Ms Gobbo’s case is essentially that the risks of disclosure and consequent harm to her were so great that she should never have been recruited as a police informer. She says that the more senior police officers who were aware she was being recruited should have stopped it, and that Assistant Commissioner Simon Overland should not have permitted her ongoing use as an informer. She says that since being publicly identified as an informer in about December 2018, she has suffered psychological injury, loss of income, and loss of earning capacity. The children’s claims are dependent upon Ms Gobbo’s claims, on the basis that it was reasonably foreseeable that her close family members would also be exposed to risks of harm to their safety if she were exposed as a police informer. The plaintiffs allege negligence on the part of 10 individual police officers.
In its consideration of the plaintiff’s case, the Court provided as follows:
At common law, the Crown was not liable for torts committed by individual police officers who were themselves responsible for exercising the powers of the office of constable and personally liable for any misuse of those powers. Now, under s 74(1) of the Victoria Police Act, the State is liable for a police tort — that is, a tort committed by a police officer in the performance or purported performance of the officer’s duties. A police officer who commits a police tort for which the State is liable is not liable to any person for the police tort [at 30].
While the State now bears liability for police torts, they can only be committed by individual police officers. In a case such as this, a plaintiff must establish that an individual police officer committed each element of the alleged police tort. A plaintiff who alleges negligence bears the burden of proving that the individual police officer owed a duty of care and breached that duty. This may involve demonstrating that the officer knew, or ought to have known, of the matters said to give rise to a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff. The knowledge of one officer cannot necessarily be attributed to others, without proof that they also knew, or ought to have known, of the relevant risk [at 31].
In those circumstances, I accept as a general proposition that the evidence of Mr Rowe, Mr White, Mr Smith, Mr O’Brien, Mr Hill, Mr Thomas, Mr Purton, and Mr Whitmore would not have assisted the State’s case. As a result, I can be more confident in accepting the evidence of the plaintiffs’ witnesses on matters about which the absent witnesses could have given evidence. I can also be bolder in drawing inferences adverse to them from the evidence that is available. However, I may not speculate about what their evidence might have been [at 40].
The relevant risk in this case is the risk of being exposed as an informer. The general causal mechanism of the harm for which Ms Gobbo claimed damages was her exposure as an informer. It does not matter that the particular harm arose from the measures taken by Victoria Police and Child Protection to protect Ms Gobbo and her children from harm, rather than being injured or killed by someone against whom she had informed [at 504].
I have no difficulty concluding that the risk of being exposed as an informer, and suffering harm as a result, would have been obvious to a reasonable person in Ms Gobbo’s position. A capable criminal defence barrister in September 2005 would reasonably have understood that the identity of an informer might become known in a number of ways. They would have known that someone within Victoria Police might leak the information. They would have been alert to the prospect of an accused person working out the source of information that had led to their arrest. They would have understood that a claim of public interest immunity to protect an informer’s identity might be defeated, and that disclosure might be ordered by a court. In addition, violent retribution had been a frequent occurrence in Melbourne’s gangland wars. The murder of the Hodsons was still a recent event [at 505].
Ms Gobbo did not establish that she was unaware of this risk. Rather, the evidence was that Ms Gobbo actually perceived and fully appreciated the risk of being exposed as an informer, and what might happen to her in that event. By September 2005, she had a sound knowledge of the existence of police informers and how they operated. She knew that there was a risk that an informer’s identity could be revealed and that, if that occurred, the informer could end up dead. She knew that the Hodsons had been murdered because Mr Hodson was an informer [at 506].
I am also satisfied that Ms Gobbo had a choice whether to start providing information to police, and whether to continue doing so. As I have found, she was not induced or prevailed upon to become an informer. Ms Gobbo had a range of other ways she could have relieved the pressure she was experiencing from Mr Mokbel and her other gangland connections. There was nothing to stop her from deciding that the risk of exposure was not worth taking, and walking away. Instead, she chose to accept the risk [at 509].
I found that Mr White, Mr Smith, and Mr Overland owed Ms Gobbo a duty to take reasonable care to avoid Ms Gobbo suffering injury in connection with being recruited as a police informer. I also found that Mr Overland owed Ms Gobbo a duty to take reasonable care to avoid her suffering injury in connection with providing information to Victoria Police [at 518].
In consideration of the nervous shock cases, the Court provided as follows at [519] to [524]:
I accept the plaintiffs’ submissions that it was reasonably foreseeable to those police officers that there was a risk of harm to Ms Gobbo’s immediate family members if she was publicly exposed as an informer. Mr Overland accepted that was the case, with the qualification that there was an unwritten rule amongst criminals that normally families are not touched. He acknowledged that Christine Hodson had been murdered, although it was her husband who was the informer.
I also accept that the police officers who owed Ms Gobbo a duty of care ought reasonably to have foreseen that she might later have children. In September 2005, Ms Gobbo was a woman in her early 30s, and it was entirely possible that she might have children at some time in the next decade. Indeed, she spoke of that possibility in her first interview with Mr White and Mr Smith, in the context of discussing what her life might be like if she stopped working in the law.
It follows that it was reasonably foreseeable that, in the event that Ms Gobbo had children, they also would be at risk of harm if she was exposed as an informer.
I am prepared to accept that Mr White, Mr Smith, Mr Thomas, and Mr Overland owed a duty of care to Ms Gobbo’s immediate family, including any future children. As the plaintiffs submitted, it is uncontroversial that a tortfeasor who causes injury to a primary victim may also breach a duty of care owed to an immediate family member of the primary victim. It does not matter that P2 and P3 were not born at the time the duty arose. There was a lifelong risk of exposure for Ms Gobbo, and the risk extended to members of her immediate family from time to time.
Consistent with my conclusions in relation to Ms Gobbo, none of Mr Rowe, Mr Mansell, Mr O’Brien, Mr Hill, Mr Purton, or Mr Whitmore owed a duty of care to P2 or P3.
The claims for damages for P2 and P3 were squarely based on Ms Gobbo’s claims in negligence, and their claims could succeed only if hers did. For the reasons I have given in relation to Ms Gobbo’s claims, none of Mr White, Mr Smith, Mr Thomas, or Mr Overland breached their duty of care to P2 and P3.
The Court further provided at [543] as follows:
The plaintiffs have not established that the injuries suffered by P2 and P3 were the result of any breach of the duty of care owed to them by Mr White, Mr Smith, Mr Thomas, or Mr Overland. They are not entitled to damages of any kind.
Ultimately, on 13 June 2025, the Victorian Supreme Court ordered that the proceeding be dismissed, and that the Court would hear the parties on the question of costs.
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