In AZX v Roman Catholic Trust Corporation for the Diocese of Townsville [2025] QSC 59, Sullivan J considered a crucial issue under Queensland’s Limitation of Actions Act 1974 — specifically, how psychiatric conditions influence the interpretation of a “reasonable person” under s 30(1)(b)(ii).

Background

The plaintiff, who suffered psychiatric injuries following alleged abuse, filed her personal injury claim on 31 May 2024. Under s 31(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act, she needed to prove that a material fact of decisive character only came within her means of knowledge after 31 May 2023. However, the evidence showed that by 3 April 2023, the plaintiff had already been advised that she likely had sustained psychiatric injuries.

Despite this knowledge, she chose to pursue alternative dispute resolution (ADR) rather than immediately commence court proceedings. During this period, the defendant’s solicitors declined to “stop the clock” on the limitation period through any legal means, further complicating matters. The plaintiff argued that, because of her psychiatric conditions, a reasonable person in her situation would not have regarded the condition in s 30(1)(b)(ii) as having been met by 3 April 2023. Instead, she claimed it only became decisive later, within the crucial 12-month window. She also submitted that her need for time to obtain appropriate advice and her reluctance to litigate due to her mental state were factors that delayed when the limitation period should start running.

Sullivan J carefully analysed the legal question: should the “reasonable person” in this context be imagined as having the plaintiff’s psychiatric conditions? His Honour accepted that the statute requires the reasonable person to take into account the plaintiff’s circumstances and interests. However, he firmly rejected the idea that the hypothetical reasonable person should also be imagined as suffering the plaintiff’s psychiatric illnesses. In a key passage, Sullivan J stated:

“For the purposes of the operation of s 30(1)(b)(ii), the reasonable person endowed with the knowledge and experience of the plaintiff is not to be treated as a reasonable person suffering from the same psychiatric condition as the plaintiff. However, the reasonable person, who has the benefit of appropriate advice, will also take the personal circumstances of the plaintiff into consideration in determining whether the material fact shows that the plaintiff ought, in their own interest, bring an action on the right of action.”

Ultimately, the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s application. Although psychiatric conditions are relevant to understanding a plaintiff’s personal circumstances, they do not transform the legal standard of the reasonable person into one sharing the plaintiff’s psychological impairments.

Implications of AZX v Roman Catholic Trust Corporation for the Diocese of Townsville

This case serves as a critical reminder that while personal circumstances must be considered under s 30(1)(b)(ii), they do not alter the core objective standard of the “reasonable person”. Practitioners advising clients with psychiatric injuries must act swiftly and carefully to avoid potential limitation pitfalls — mental health struggles alone will not delay the operation of time limits without clear supporting evidence.

Would-be plaintiffs must act quickly to protect their entitlements to compensation. To most effectively protect their rights, any injured person, whether physically or psychologically injured, should contact a personal injury lawyer urgently to understand the strict time limits that apply.

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