In the recent matter of H v RJ [2024] NSWSC 1404, the first defendant (RJ) is 16-year-old boy who has been diagnosed with arrhythmogenic right ventricular cardiomyopathy (fatty fibrous tissue replaces normal heart muscle and interrupts normal electrical signals in the heart), a condition which places him at risk of suffering life threatening arrhythmia of the heart. The heart also becomes weaker over time, leading to heart failure. RJ’s treating practitioner, a Paediatric Congenital Heart surgeon, recommends the surgical insertion of an implantable cardioverter defibrillator, a device which will maintain a normal heart rhythm.
The general risk associated with this procedure is low, but if something were to go wrong, and bleeding caused, RJ may need a blood transfusion. Whether this is needed will, of course, be a matter for clinical judgment, which will only be able to be made when the circumstances have arisen calling for it. There are other products (not whole blood, red cells, white cells, platelets or plasma) which could be helpful in the event of misadventure, but the use of such products may bring with it dilution of RJ’s red blood cell count. Red blood cells play a key role in carrying oxygen to tissue and dilution brings with it the risk of organ (including brain) damage.
RJ and his mother and father (the parents) are devoted adherents to the Jehovah’s Witness faith. They consent to the surgery but based on biblical precepts “to abstain from blood”, they oppose blood transfusion.
The hospital file a summons seeking the following orders:
12. A declaration (in the Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction or otherwise), that in the absence of the consent of the parents of RJ…(‘the authorised clinician’) of the Hospital is authorised to order that:
(a) any qualified member of nursing staff of the Hospital; or
(b) any qualified medical practitioner employed or contracted by the Hospital administer the blood transfusion procedures in relation to RJ during his admission for implantation of the implantable cardioverter defibrillator if:
- in the opinion of the authorised clinician, the blood transfusion procedures are necessary rather than any other medical procedures;
- in forming the opinion referred to in 12(b)(i), the authorised clinician at all times seeks to avoid unnecessary use of and to minimise the use of blood transfusion procedures.
13. In the event that the authorised clinician is not available, then for the purposes of order 12, the authorised clinician shall instead be a medical practitioner of the Hospital, provided that that person has access to and has read a copy of these orders.
14. That for the purposes of these orders:
(a) the transfusion of blood or blood products and a reinfusion of RJ’s own blood; and
(b) treatment ancillary to 14(a)
be referred to as the ‘blood transfusion procedures’.
RJ’s treating practitioner gave affidavit evidence and was cross-examined. He was an impressive witness whose evidence can be distilled into the following:
- the risk of something going wrong is low, but this can and does happen;
- not every situation where things go wrong needs a blood transfusion, but some, where bleeding has taken place, do;
- whether a blood transfusion is needed is a matter of clinical judgment and whilst there is a predisposition against transfusions, the clinician should not hold back if, in her or his judgment, the safety of the patient warrants it. That safety involves, amongst others, avoiding the possibility of organ damage; and
- the risk involved in blood transfusion itself is very low.
There is also a comprehensive report by a clinical psychologist which concludes that RJ is not yet at a level where he can function autonomously or independently in the specific area of medical decision making and despite his otherwise, generally, good age-appropriate maturity, in the specific area of medical decision making he continues to lack appropriate competence.
In its consideration, the Court noted as follows at [15] to [17]:
The overriding consideration is the welfare and best interests of RJ. Giving due weight to the wishes of his parents and his own level of autonomy, I am persuaded that the Court should exercise its jurisdiction to override RJ’s and his parents’ position.
The fact that the risk of something going wrong is low, and that the risk of requiring blood only arises if the original risk comes home and, even then, is not an inevitability, is a factor which in my opinion strongly favours the order sought. Because of these circumstances, it is unlikely that RJ’s wishes and those of his parents will be overridden. It is therefore unlikely that there will be non-observance of the tenets of their faith.
But if the situation arises where those wishes must (in the judgment of the plainly highly competent doctors in whose care he finds himself) be overridden, his safety and wellbeing are paramount.
Ultimately, on 4 November 2024, the New South Wales Supreme Court ordered that the medical practitioners may administer a blood transfusion to RJ if they are of the opinion that a blood transfusion is necessary.
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