Background
The applicant was employed by the Brisbane City Council in a call centre operated by the respondent, beginning on 28 July 2008. During a typical shift, the appellant would field 50 to 60 incoming calls, some of which were aggressive, distressing, abusive, or repetitive. The respondent provided some training on handling abusive calls, including instructing employees to warn callers that the call could be terminated if they did not cease their abusive behavior.
The plaintiff had a history of psychological difficulties, including emotional distress from a past controlling relationship. In 2009, she took time off work and was assessed by a psychiatrist. Aware of her mental health concerns, the defendant reduced her workload from five to four days per week.
The applicant frequently fielded calls from a particularly problematic complainant, WOC, who regularly reported maintenance issues. He was often condescending and persistent. In 2015, a colleague experienced anxiety after a call with WOC and reported it to a supervisor.
The plaintiff testified that WOC became increasingly troublesome in 2016, persistently calling to ensure his complaints were logged or simply to chat, which unsettled her. In October 2016, she requested time off and provided a medical certificate to her supervisor. Other staff also found WOC difficult, as he would call up to 20–30 times a night.
On 5 March 2017, the plaintiff received a call from WOC that deeply disturbed her—he was in the women’s restroom at New Farm Park, complaining about the paint. Overwhelmed, she broke down and was unable to continue working. She subsequently filed a compensation claim and resigned on 11 May 2018.
Decision at First Instance
At trial, the respondent accepted that it owed the applicant a duty of care but argued that neither a breach of duty nor causation had been established. In its view, it had taken reasonable steps to ensure the applicant’s safety, including developing formal policies and providing training on managing difficult complainants. Quantum was agreed upon between the parties.
The appellant’s claim was dismissed. The court opined that there was no foreseeable risk of injury. In the court’s view, the foreseeability of injury depended on signs of distress from the employee, and in this case, there was little evidence of outward indicators that “signpost[ed] the internal turmoil the plaintiff was feeling.”
Griffin v Brisbane City Council: Employment and Work Conditions
The Court of Appeal set aside the primary judge’s orders of 8 December 2023, remitting the matter to Richards DCJ for a further hearing and reasons.
The court found that the primary judge was not justified in dismissing the appellant’s claim on the basis she did. As noted by the court, the claim was dismissed on the sole basis that the injury sustained by the appellant was not reasonably foreseeability, failing to decide or provide primary findings of fact in respect of the basis on which the respondent had denied liability (i.e. breach of duty and causation).
The court referenced Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v Kim Yen Tat, which identifies that the proper starting point for assessing liability in workplace injury cases is sections 305B–305E of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (QLD). The primary judge’s failure to engage with the questions of breach or causation, as required by the statute, rendered the dismissal of the claim erroneous.
Costs
The appellant argued that costs should follow the event, meaning the respondent should pay her appeal costs. The respondent, however, submitted that neither party was at fault for the matter being remitted and that neither had achieved substantive success. As such, it argued that appeal costs should reflect the costs in the proceedings below.
The court partially rejected the respondent’s submission. It noted that the respondent had opposed the appeal and sought to uphold the primary judge’s orders, meaning the appellant had substantively won on appeal. However, the court acknowledged that the ultimate success of either party remained undetermined.
- The court ultimately ordered that:
- The appellant’s costs of the appeal be her costs in the remitted hearing.
- The respondent bear its own costs of the appeal.
