Manca v Teys Australia: 2024 QCA Decision on Workers’ Compensation

In the matter of Manca v Teys Australia Beenleigh Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 60, the plaintiff, Mr Reinaldo Manca, commenced proceedings against the defendant, Teys Australia Beenleigh Pty Ltd, in relation to a workplace injury.

For several months in late 2019 and early 2020, the plaintiff worked on a part of the “kill floor” at Teys’ Beenleigh meat works. His work was slicing meat to remove fat and using a saw to cut briskets. About a week before being injured on 11 February 2020, the plaintiff was transferred to do different work in a different environment on “the blooding floor”. Unlike his previous work, his work on the blooding floor required him to come and go up via stairs. They consisted of six concrete steps. After performing the required preliminary washdown after a day at work, he was carrying his knife pouch, with knives in it and a hook hanging from it, in one hand. His sharpening steels and stone were in his other hand. His rubber apron was draped over an arm. As a result, he was not able to use a hand to hold onto the handrail at the right side of the steps as he descended. When he reached the second or third step, his right foot slipped and he fell backwards, hitting the left side of his back on the edge of a stair.

Plaintiff’s Allegations

The plaintiff’s pleading alleged that “the surfaces and edges of some of the concrete steps were damaged and worn and covered in blood and other fluids/substances from recently slaughtered carcasses…”. The pleading alleged that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the defendant’s negligence. The first two particulars were as follows:

(a) failing to take adequate precautions for the safety of the Plaintiff while he was engaged in carrying out his assigned work at the workplace;

(b) exposing the Plaintiff while he was at the workplace to a risk of injury, namely the risk of slipping down the steps, of which risk the Defendant was aware or ought to have been aware…”

(c) failing to take reasonable care for the Plaintiff by ensuring that the workplace was safe by:

(i) repairing the damaged and worn edges of the steps;

(ii) providing a non-slip surface and metal edge strips to the steps;

(iii) otherwise ensuring the steps were kept clean of blood and other fluids/substances from recently slaughtered and bled carcasses by, for example, a system of regular cleaning;

(iv) failing to conduct an adequate assessment of the risks posed to its workers at the workplace associated with the tasks carried out thereat and, in particular, the risk of slipping on blood or other fluids/substances from recently slaughtered carcasses which had found its way onto the steps from the adjacent work floor;

(v) failing to respond adequately to previous slips and/or falls by other staff members on the steps because of the presence of blood and other fluids/substances thereon, and/or because the surface and edges of the steps were damaged and worn;

(vi) failing to take any or sufficient steps to prevent the hazard created by the damaged and worn and contaminated steps, or to quickly remove the hazard once it had been created;

(vii) failing to repair the damaged and worn steps to ensure they ceased to present a risk to persons walking thereon;

(viii) failing to warn the Plaintiff that the steps were damaged, worn and slippery from the presence of blood or other fluids/substances which had found their way onto the steps, and that walking thereon would be likely to cause him to slip and fall;

(ix) in breach of s 19(1) of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld), failing to ensure the health and safety of the Plaintiff while he was at work in the business or undertaking, by eliminating or minimising the risk of him slipping on the steps of the premises;

(x) in breach of s 19(3) of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld), failing to properly manage the Plaintiff’s exposure to risk from the work environment provided to him be eliminating or minimising the risk of him slipping on the steps of the premises.

The Defence

The defendant denied the allegation that the surfaces and edges of the concrete steps were damaged and worn, and denied that they were covered in blood and other substances from carcasses. The defendant also denied that it was negligent. Among the matters relied upon by the defendant in its defence were the process of cleaning the floor, the concrete surfaces and steps being coated in a non‑slip paint, the absence of previous slips or falls by other employees on the steps, and the provision of good condition, quality leather boots with adequate grip to reduce the risk of falls. The defendant also relied upon the requirement to undertake a “full apron wash” prior to exiting the kill floor and using the steps. The defendant also pleaded that it trained and instructed the plaintiff to use the handrails provided on the steps and erected signs on the premises to remind workers to use handrails. The defendant pleaded that it provided a safe system of work for its employees to exit the kill floor by providing a pouch in which to keep equipment, requiring the worker to undertake a full apron wash, including a boot wash, before accessing the stairs, and training and instructing workers to use the handrail that was provided. The defendant alleged that the plaintiff failed to take reasonable care for his own safety. The incident was alleged to have been caused by the plaintiff’s actions in failing to conduct a full apron wash and boot wash, failing to carry equipment in one hand, failing to make use of the handrail and thereby failing to comply with the required procedure.

Trial Hearing

The primary judge reached the following conclusion about the cause of the plaintiff’s fall:

The nett effect of all this evidence is that it is not clear what caused Mr Manca to slip and fall. I am not satisfied that there was congealed blood in the tracks of his boots nor, if and to the extent that there was, that any such blood was slippery. There was no expert evidence about the slipperiness or otherwise of blood: what evidence there was, was conflicting, with two witnesses saying it is slippery and two saying it is not. I do not find that it was slippery but, even if it was, I consider that the tread on the boots would likely have been adequate to ameliorate its slipperiness. Furthermore, if it was, to Mr Manca’s knowledge, slippery, that would have a substantial effect on any finding about contributory negligence.

I am satisfied that the steps at the time were not wet, as there is no evidence that any water or other fluid was present on them when Mr Manca descended them. I am not satisfied that they had any spilt or sprayed blood on them. If there had been, it is likely that someone would have seen it, but no witness gave evidence of having seen it and Mr Rodgrigues said there was none that he saw.

While the edges of the steps were not fully even, there were no defects that, in my view, would of themselves had caused Mr Manca to slip and fall. Rather, it seems that, for some reason (probably his own inattention), he misplaced his foot onto the edge (rather than the floor) of a step, causing it to slip out from under him, which in turn led him to fall back and land on the edge of a higher step on his rear left back and rib area. It was an unfortunate accident but was not caused by any defect in, or uncleanliness of, the steps, nor by any material, such as blood, built up in the tread of his boots.

The judge found that the plaintiff “was not specifically instructed by Teys to use handrails”. However, he was aware that it was prudent to do so, having been instructed to do by a former employer when he worked in Ireland, and he was aware that it was advised by signs in a number of places around the meat works.

The primary judge did not accept that the plaintiff had no choice in the matter of having to carry his equipment using both hands. His Honour found that it would have been possible for the plaintiff to wear the apron and the knife pouch, carrying the knives in the pouch, rather than to carry them, and to carry the sharpening tools and stone in one hand.

The primary judge found that there was not a foreseeable risk of a worker slipping on the steps, given the precautions that the defendant had taken to avoid or minimise a risk that might otherwise have existed. The primary judge stated:

There had been no prior incident of slipping reported to Teys. Although I accept Mr Fry’s evidence that he had previously complained about a substantial amount of blood or water on the floor and the steps, that appears to have been one occasion only and was certainly not the norm, nor expected, even though some droplets of blood might splash or spray on or near the steps from time to time. Furthermore, in the absence of expert evidence about whether blood is slippery, I do not find that it was slippery or contributed to the risk of a person slipping if there was blood on the floor or in the treads of his boots. The boots were also clearly designed to be non-slip. Finally, it is unlikely that blood is slippery or that the tread of the boots did not prevent slipping when, in order to leave a washdown cubicle to go onto the walkway toward the stairs, it was necessary to walk along the sloped edge of the blooding floor basin, on which there would be blood. There was no evidence that that edge was slippery or difficult to walk along.

The judge also found that the steps taken by the defendant were reasonable and sufficient to mitigate the risk of anyone slipping on the steps. The steps had a rough, non-slip surface. Employees were instructed to use a handrail and there were facilities for employees to undertake a preliminary rinse of their aprons and boots. The fact that the defendant later installed metal capping on the edges of the steps did not prove that it was negligent for it not to have done so earlier. In any event, there was no evidence comparing the non-slip status of steps before and after the installation of the capping.

The primary judge continued:

I also consider that it was not foreseeable that a worker might slip on the steps while carrying equipment in both hands and thus not using the handrail. It was unnecessary for a worker to carry so much equipment that he could not do so with one hand and use the other to grip the handrail. Workers were also instructed – and reminded by signs in various places around the meatworks – to use handrails and they were expected to do so. The floor and the steps were of non-slip material and, according to Mr Platten, along with the rest of the plant were the subject of regular safety inspections and maintenance or improvements where considered appropriate. There was no evidence that Teys was aware that any employee, let alone Mr Manca, had a habit of carrying all his equipment in two hands and not using the handrail. In the circumstances, the risk of injury from slipping on the steps was not a risk of which Teys knew or ought reasonably to have known, given the precautions that Teys had taken against any such risk.

Having concluded that the precautions taken by the defendant against a risk of slipping were reasonable, that the defendant was not negligent, and that the claim should be dismissed, the judge made precautionary findings on issues of contributory negligence and loss and damage. The judge declined to find any failure by the plaintiff to adequately wash down his apron and boots, as having contributed to his fall. It was, however, “crystal clear” that the plaintiff’s failure to use the handrail contributed to his fall.

Appeal

The notice of appeal and the plaintiff’s outline of argument mostly consist of ambitious challenges to findings of fact. The plaintiff seeks to argue that findings should be set aside because the conclusions are glaringly improbable, or contrary to compelling inferences, or wrong. The defendant’s outline of argument responds to the plaintiff’s contentions that findings of fact about the scene of the accident and the cause of the accident should be overturned. The defendant notes that the judge’s ultimate conclusions were based on central findings of fact made by him that:

(a) the plaintiff had not proved what caused him to slip and fall, but it was likely that he slipped due to accidentally misplacing one foot incorrectly on a step;

(b) the primary judge was not satisfied that there was congealed blood in the tracks of the plaintiff’s boots nor, if and to the extent that there was, that any such blood was slippery;

(c) the steps at the time were not wet and the primary judge was not satisfied that they had any spilt or sprayed blood on them;

(d) there were no defects that would of themselves had caused the plaintiff to slip and fall; and

(e) the plaintiff’s accident was not caused by any defect in, or uncleanliness of, the steps, nor by any material, such as blood, built up in the tread of his boots.

When considering whether the trial judge erred in failing to find that the steps were bloody or wet, the Court provided as follows at [108]:

In my view, the trial judge’s findings about the presence or absence of blood and water on the steps on the day in question and prior to Mr Manca’s fall have not been shown to be in error. They were open on the evidence and in the absence of any evidence from Mr Manca of having seen blood on the steps at about the time of the fall. The primary judge’s finding has not been demonstrated to be wrong by incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony. The finding is not glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inferences. Ground 3 and associated points made in connection with the cause of the fall in grounds 10 and 11 are not established.

When considering Mr Manca’s boots and congealed blood, the Court provided at [126] to [127] as follows:

Overall, the state of the evidence did not require the primary judge to be satisfied that there was congealed blood in the tracks of Mr Manca’s boots at the time he fell, or that any congealed blood that remained in the deep tracks prevented the tread on the soles of his boots from functioning. The finding that the tread on the boots would likely have been adequate to ameliorate the slipperiness of blood (assuming blood to be slippery), was one that was open to the primary judge to reach.

Mr Manca has not established that the primary judge erred in his findings about congealed blood and boots.

When considering the physical state of the steps, the Court provided as follows at [139]:

The primary judge did not find that he slipped because of the state of the edge of the second or third step. The state of the evidence did not require the judge to find that the physical state of the steps caused him to fall.

When considering the ability to carry the sharpening tools and stone in one hand, the Court provided at [145] as follows:

The judge did not specifically find that Mr Manca might have placed two of the sharpening steels, along with the knives, in the pouch, leaving him to carry a third steel and the stone in one hand. He found, however, that it would have been possible for him to wear the apron and the knife pouch, carrying the knives in the pouch, rather than to carry them, the sharpening tools and stone in one hand. This finding did not depend upon Mr Rodrigues’ evidence of what he saw after the event. It was a conclusion based upon the evidence, including the cross-examination of Mr Manca and Mr Manca’s demonstration in court. The evidence did not convince the judge that Mr Manca could not have strapped the knife pouch around his waist and held the remaining equipment in one hand. Appropriate consideration should be given to the advantage which the primary judge had in assessing the evidence, including Mr Manca’s evidence and his demonstration. Mr Manca has not surmounted the high threshold required to overturn a finding of fact that was open to the judge to reach on this issue.

When considering foreseeability and “not insignificant” risk of injury, the Court provided at [159}

In my view, the primary judge was correct to conclude in the light of his findings of fact that the precautions noted by him meant the risk of a person being injured by slipping on the steps was insignificant. It is sufficient to conclude, however, that the judge’s conclusion that the risk was “not significant” has not been shown to be in error.

When considering the reasonable precautions ground, the Court provided at [165]:

The primary judge has not been shown to have erred in his assessment of whether, in the circumstances, a reasonable person in Teys’ position would have taken the pleaded precautions.

When considering the causation ground, the Court provided at [169] as follows:

In summary, the matters relied upon in ground 10 do not show that the judge erred in concluding that it was not clear what caused Mr Manca to slip and fall and that, therefore, Mr Manca had not proved that he slipped due to any failure by Teys to take reasonable precautions against the risk of slipping.

At [178] to [179], the Court provided as follows:

Mr Manca has failed to overturn the findings of fact about which he contends the judge erred. Those findings of fact were sufficient to allow the judge to reach the conclusions that he did on foreseeability, significant risk, reasonable precautions, and causation.

The judge’s ultimate finding that Mr Manca had not proved that he slipped due to a failure by Teys to take reasonable precautions, namely the reasonable precautions pleaded by Mr Manca, was not in error. I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

Ultimately, the Queensland Court of Appeal ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

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